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The logic is simple: the more neighbouring countries gain economically from India’s connectivity network, the greater their incentive to keep those routes functioning
At its narrowest, the Siliguri Corridor is only about 20 kilometres wide and any disruption could threaten the movement of people, fuel, food and military supplies to the eight north-eastern states. (News18)
For decades, the Siliguri Corridor—the narrow stretch of land connecting mainland India to the Northeast—has been one of the country’s most sensitive strategic vulnerabilities.
At its narrowest, the corridor is only about 20 kilometres wide. Any disruption, whether caused by conflict, blockade, a natural disaster or another major crisis, could threaten the movement of people, fuel, food and military supplies to the eight north-eastern states.
But India is increasingly trying to ensure that the Northeast does not depend on this single land link.
Under the Narendra Modi government, several older connectivity projects have received renewed funding and political push, while newer arrangements have sought to create a network of sea, river, road and rail routes through Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan.
The strategy is less about replacing the Siliguri Corridor than creating enough alternatives that its disruption does not automatically isolate the Northeast.
Government sources describe the approach as creating a wider infrastructure and diplomatic “web” around the traditional chokepoint.
Kaladan: The Myanmar Route
One of the most important pieces of this network is the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
The framework agreement for the project was signed in 2008, but the project received a renewed push under the Modi government. The Sittwe Port component was inaugurated in May 2023, and the wider project is now targeted for completion by 2027.
The route is designed to connect India’s Northeast with the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. Cargo can move from the Indian port of Kolkata to Sittwe in Myanmar, then travel by river and road towards Mizoram.
Its strategic importance is straightforward: if the Siliguri Corridor becomes unavailable, the route offers an alternative way of supplying the southern part of the Northeast without relying on the narrow land bridge or passing through Bangladesh.
For India, however, this route also carries a geopolitical risk of its own because it depends on stability and access in Myanmar.
Tripura Gets Two Bangladesh Links
Tripura has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of India’s efforts to create alternative connectivity through Bangladesh.
The Agartala-Akhaura railway link, whose MoU was signed in 2013 and construction began after the foundation stone was laid in 2016, was inaugurated by PM Modi and then Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina in November 2023.
The railway gives Tripura a direct connection to Bangladesh and, through the country’s transport network, access towards its ports.
Then there is the Maitri Setu, the bridge over the Feni River connecting Sabroom in southern Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh. Inaugurated by PM Modi in March 2021, the bridge is around 80 km from Chattogram Port.
Together, the rail link and Maitri Setu create two different logistics options for Tripura. In a crisis affecting the Siliguri Corridor, essential supplies could potentially enter the state from Bangladesh rather than travelling through the long Guwahati-Siliguri route.
Chattogram And Mongla: India Gets Access To Bangladesh’s Ports
The strategy goes beyond individual bridges and railway lines.
India has also developed arrangements allowing the movement of Indian cargo through Chattogram and Mongla ports in Bangladesh, linked to inland waterways, roads and railways.
The process involved a series of agreements beginning in 2015, followed by a formal agreement in 2018, a Standard Operating Procedure in 2019 and a permanent transit order in 2023.
The significance is that cargo from the Bay of Bengal can potentially enter the Northeast through a combination of sea, river, rail and road networks. That creates something India has historically lacked: a logistics alternative to the Siliguri bottleneck.
For bulk commodities, fuel and other essential supplies, such routes can be strategically important during a disruption.
BBIN: Building A Legal Network Around The Geography
Infrastructure alone cannot create a corridor. There also has to be a legal framework allowing vehicles and goods to cross borders.
That is where the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement, signed in Thimphu in June 2015, becomes important. The agreement sought to establish common rules for the movement of passenger and cargo vehicles between the four countries.
Although implementation has faced political and logistical hurdles, the broader idea is important: India’s connectivity strategy is not just about building roads and bridges, but making cross-border movement legally possible.
The more integrated the transport systems of the region become, the greater the number of options available if one route is disrupted.
The Eastward Escape Route: India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway
India is also looking beyond Bangladesh.
The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway is intended to connect India’s Northeast with Myanmar and Thailand, creating an overland link towards Southeast Asia. The idea dates back to 2002, but the project received renewed momentum after 2014 under the Modi government’s Act East Policy.
Construction has involved critical stretches such as Kalewa-Yagyi, with the broader project currently targeting completion around 2027.
Strategically, this route does something different from the Bangladesh links. It does not merely provide an alternative supply line into the Northeast. It potentially turns the region into an eastward gateway to ASEAN markets.
In a scenario where India’s western land connectivity is disrupted, the Northeast could theoretically remain connected to external supply chains through Myanmar and Southeast Asia.
Nepal, Bhutan And Bangladesh: The Diplomatic Layer
There is another component to the strategy that cannot be built with concrete—Diplomacy.
Government sources argue that physical infrastructure is useful only when accompanied by stable political relationships with India’s neighbours.
India has therefore sought greater sub-regional cooperation with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal on transport, energy, trade, waterways and border connectivity. The strategic logic is that India’s neighbours should have a direct economic stake in keeping these routes open.
If Bangladesh benefits economically from Indian cargo moving through its territory, if Nepal and Bhutan benefit from connectivity and energy cooperation, and if the Northeast becomes a larger market for the region, then maintaining those links becomes a shared interest.
In other words, economic interdependence becomes a soft buffer around India’s hard strategic vulnerability.
The Bigger Strategy: From A Corridor To A Web
The Chicken’s Neck will remain India’s principal land connection to much of the Northeast, particularly for military movement and large-scale logistics.
But the calculation changes if alternative routes are available.
Instead of asking whether the Siliguri Corridor can be protected from every possible disruption, India can also ask a different question: What happens if it isn’t?
That is where the emerging network matters.
There is, however, a major caveat. Many of these alternative routes pass through countries where political conditions can change rapidly.
The Kaladan project depends on Myanmar, where the security situation remains deeply unstable. Routes through Bangladesh depend on sustained diplomatic engagement with Dhaka. BBIN connectivity has its own political and implementation challenges.
This means India’s alternative connectivity strategy is partly an infrastructure project and partly a diplomatic project.
Government sources argue that India’s objective is to align the economic interests of neighbouring countries with India’s own regional stability.
The logic is simple: the more neighbouring countries gain economically from India’s connectivity network, the greater their incentive to keep those routes functioning.
For India, therefore, the long-term answer to the Siliguri problem may not be one giant alternative corridor. It may be a mesh of smaller corridors—rail, road, river and sea—backed by enough economic and diplomatic interdependence to ensure that the Northeast cannot easily be cut off from the rest of the country.
Key Questions Answered
Ask News18The new routes are expected to boost economic activity in Northeast India by improving connectivity, facilitating trade, reducing travel times and costs, and creating new job and business opportunities. This includes direct road access to Southeast Asian markets, strengthening trade with ASEAN economies.
Ask News18About the Author
Group Editor, Investigations and Security Affairs, Network18
August 21, 2026, 3:40 PM IST
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