The US has reportedly proposed a 15-point plan to Iran for ending the US-Iran war. Iran has made its own conditions for an agreement known. It is evident that these are maximalist positions on both sides, and any eventual agreement would involve compromises.
But if one side or the other lays out its positions in public through background briefings or in reaction to the proposals aired through the media, it raises suspicions about the seriousness of the negotiation exercise.
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Serious negotiations need to be held behind the scenes with as much confidentiality as possible. If the maximalist positions are publicised for whatever reason in advance, then the text of the final agreement will be assessed by the public on the basis of how much either side was forced to make concessions on core issues of difference. The governments concerned will then have to offer explanations. This public diplomacy only complicates the search for a balanced negotiating outcome in actual negotiations.
In May 2025, the US had proposed a 15-point plan, which gives a clue to what the US might be seeking. It promised an end only to nuclear-related sanctions, not all sanctions, including human rights sanctions. The funds released could not be used to fund Iran’s ballistic missile programme. All uranium stockpiles would be down-blended to 3.67 % and shipped out of Iran immediately. All enrichment facilities of Iran would be made unusable within a month, and centrifuges would be rendered inoperable. The US would help fund a new Iranian civil nuclear programme with a fuel facility located outside Iran and subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. A regional enrichment consortium would be established involving Iran, the US, the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia under external management.
The US wants to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme is not revived, and for that, it would want to have oversight over it beyond that of the IAEA. It wants to carve out a role for itself in Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, as we have seen. One cannot see Iran giving any supervisory role to the US or agreeing to its participation in its nuclear programme in any form. Or agreeing to shut down its nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow or Isfahan, as sought by the US.
A Gradual Breakdown
In the JCPOA, Iran had made a clear and firm commitment that it would not acquire nuclear weapons. In the talks mediated by Oman in Geneva, Iran seemed to have made major concessions on the nuclear front that it had not made before, but Trump chose to attack Iran nevertheless. It is most unlikely that Iran will go beyond what it was willing to concede in the talks at Geneva. So, when Trump keeps saying that the US would not allow Iran to become nuclear, it is not clear what exactly the terms are that he thinks he can force Iran to accept.
Seeking curbs on Iran’s missile programme, which has shown its potency in the ongoing conflict, is an old US demand. Iran has rejected this demand before and will no doubt oppose it even more forcefully today. Without a nuclear shield and also a missile shield that provides it some deterrence capability, Iran would render itself defenceless. Iran has no worthwhile air force or a robust air defence system. It is unlikely to accept any binding limits to the range of its missiles, as missiles and drones give it a credible retaliatory capability.
Much has been made about Iran unveiling its missile with an IRBM range by attacking Diego Garcia. Iran has developed its missile capability independent of the G-7-initiated Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which has 35 members today. Iran is not a member. Pakistan, too, is not. A sovereign country may have self-imposed limits on the range of its missiles, keeping in mind the source of threats to it or to avoid creating misgivings in other countries about its strategic intentions. It is most unlikely that Iran will accept any binding limits on the range or the technical capabilities of its missiles after the two US-Israeli attacks against it and the assassination of its top leadership.
The Question Of Proxies
On Iran’s regional role, which means its anti-Israel policies and concomitant support for Hezbollah, Hamas or the Houthis, Iran, again, is unlikely to bind itself to any understandings with the US. It is a fact that Iran’s support for its so-called proxies in the region has been diminished. That this Iranian regional role is linked to perceived US-backed Israel’s expansionist policies in the region should not be ignored. So long as Israel’s policies against the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, its rejection of a two-state solution, its policies in Lebanon, occupation of territory in Syria, and the Greater Israel project of the country’s extremists are not revised, the region will remain unstable and conflict-ridden.
On the other hand, Iran’s demands would be humiliating for the US to accept. Iran wants the US to remove all its bases from the region, agree to reparations for the destruction caused, lift all sanctions, and commit itself to not reimposing sanctions. Iran would want international guarantees against any future aggression. Iran would also exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz.
The Dilemma Of The Gulf Nations
Even if the Gulf countries feel that their security alliance with the US -allowing American bases on their territory and buying arms from the US – has not given them the protection they expected, and that the US has given priority to Israel’s security, the fact remains that they will become more vulnerable to Iran’s power if the US withdrew from the region. Already, the Saudi Crown Prince has voiced concerns that Iran will feel more emboldened in the future if the US retreats. All this is apart from the US suffering a major geopolitical defeat if it were to quit this region, as the power vacuum will be filled by China and Russia. The Gulf states will also be looking for some kind of guarantees from Iran through a non-aggression pact.
Reparations are imposed on countries that surrender. The US has used sanctions to impose its will on others. It is a tool that will not give up, as it is linked to the use of the US dollar and America’s control of the international financial system to wield global power. It is not clear how the international guarantees that Iran seeks can be worked out practically.
The UN Security Council guarantees would mean that all the P5 countries must be on the same page, but even if they were, the case of the Minsk agreements on Ukraine shows that such underwriting is brittle. Will the guarantor countries be willing to use force to obtain compliance if one of them decides to violate the agreement? We have already seen how Russia and China have not been able to push back against the unlawful actions of the US against Venezuela and Iran, or those of Israel in the region, despite these actions damaging their national interest.
Who Gets Hormuz?
As for the Strait of Hormuz, no country will give Iran the right to legally control an international waterway. This will be in violation of Article 38 of UNCLOS and the principle of freedom of navigation and unimpeded passage in international waters, which is also invoked in the case of the South China Sea. This is an overreach by Iran.
Finally, there is the central question of how much Iran can trust Trump. Despite years of differences over the nuclear issues and Iran’s problematic regional role, he is the first US president to attack Iran and assassinate its top political leadership, and that too conjointly with Israel. He is the one who repudiated the JCPOA. He has walked out of many major international agreements and institutions, which shows that he considers nothing sacrosanct. He has bullied the close allies of the US and alienated them. He continually makes statements on Iran that are insulting, demeaning, frivolous, whimsical, contradictory and untruthful. There is a strong belief that he plays with market sentiments with his tailored statements. Even as he is seeking a negotiated solution, US Marines are being deployed for a land operation to take control of Kharg Island.
The Gulf countries, as well as Turkey and Egypt, want the war to end, as it is very costly for the region. Pakistan is caught in a bind as it has a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and Iran is a direct neighbour. It does not want a situation to develop where Saudi Arabia invokes the defence pact against Iran. To avoid that situation, it is presenting itself as a useful messenger between the parties.
Iran faces a big dilemma. Peace would be in its interest, too, as it risks paying an increasingly steep price for continued resistance. But not at any price. Iran believes it is facing an existential threat. Hardliners are now in power in Tehran. Iran can legitimately ask itself about the value and durability of any agreement with the US.
(Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
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