Last Updated:
Former Israeli intelligence chief Amos Yadlin also pointed out that the war has significantly delayed Iran’s nuclear clock.
Former Israeli intelligence chief Amos Yadlin. (X/@YadlinAmos)
For Israel, this is not just another round of escalation; it is, as a former intelligence chief puts it, a “war of necessity”. The objective is clear: to take on what he calls the “head of the terror octopus” in Iran, even if it comes at a cost Israelis are prepared to bear.
Weeks into the conflict that began with massive joint US-Israel strikes on February 28, the war has already reshaped the battlefield, from setting back Tehran’s nuclear programme to exposing the depth of Israel’s intelligence penetration inside Iran.
But the story is no longer just about bombs and missiles. There is growing diplomatic churn behind the scenes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is seen as one of the few leaders with leverage on both sides, even as reports suggest talks could bypass Israel altogether and move through a Pakistan backchannel.
In this exclusive conversation with CNN-News18, former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin lays out how Israel sees the war, the risks it is willing to take, and what victory might ultimately look like.
Edited excerpts below:
Q. So, you’ve argued this war was necessary to stop Iran from going nuclear. But critics say Israel effectively launched a pre-emptive war. What, in concrete intelligence terms, made this threat imminent enough to justify military action?
Amos Yadlin: Let me set the record straight. From our perspective, this war did not begin with Israel. It began with the Iranian regime’s own actions, both internally against its people and externally against Israel.
Iran has consistently called for Israel’s destruction. It is the only UN member state that openly speaks about wiping another country off the map. At the same time, it has been advancing capabilities to act on that threat, through both its nuclear programme and an expanding ballistic missile arsenal.
Israeli intelligence assessed that Iran was significantly scaling up missile production, with thousands of projectiles that could directly target Israeli population centres.
And this is not theoretical. We’ve already seen large-scale attacks, with hundreds of missiles and drones launched towards Israel in recent months, including strikes aimed at civilian areas.
So, for Israel, this is about prevention. The objective is to neutralise capabilities that pose a direct and growing threat to its existence.
Q. There are indications that Washington may now be pushing for de-escalation. Do you think the US underestimated Iran’s capacity or willingness to retaliate?
Amos Yadlin: I see this war playing out on three different chessboards.
First, the direct Iran–Israel military front. Here, Israel believes it has the upper hand, degrading Iran’s missile capabilities, drones, and key elements of its military infrastructure.
Second, the asymmetric arena, where Iran is exerting pressure through the Gulf, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz. This is essentially an energy war, and it remains unresolved.
Third, the global stage, where the United States is signalling to powers like China and Russia that it intends to maintain dominance over global security and energy flows.
So, these are three overlapping conflicts, each with different players and stakes. As for Washington, the US President has been adjusting timelines and pressure points, which suggests this is still a fluid situation. Ultimately, the timing of escalation or de-escalation will depend heavily on US decisions.
Q. But from Iran’s perspective, this was an unprovoked attack on its sovereign territory. How does Israel justify the legality and legitimacy of these strikes under international law?
Amos Yadlin: From Israel’s perspective, this is not an unprovoked attack. Iran has, for decades, supported and enabled attacks against Israel through proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, providing funding, weapons, and training.
How do you justify a long record of attacks linked to Iranian networks, including incidents like the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires?
Beyond that, Iran has repeatedly called for Israel’s destruction while developing the military capabilities to act on those threats.
So, from an Israeli standpoint, this is a war of necessity, to prevent another Holocaust. The argument is that when a state faces a declared intent to destroy it, it has the right to act in self-defence, even if that interpretation is debated under international law.
Q. You call it “a war of necessity”, but several countries have refused to provide bases or direct military support to the US to avoid being drawn in. Does this signal a lack of global consensus on the war? Has Israel been diplomatically isolated more than expected?
Amos Yadlin: With all due respect to international consensus, Israel cannot base its security on it. If it had, Israel might not exist today.
For decades, there has been a consistent bias against Israel in forums like the United Nations, where automatic majorities often go against it.
So, from Israel’s perspective, this is not about consensus; it is about survival. The country is acting on its own security needs, with the backing of its key ally, the United States.
Q. But Israeli cities like Tel Aviv have also faced sustained missile fire. At what point does the cost to Israeli civilians begin to outweigh the strategic gains of continuing this war?
Amos Yadlin: Israel has one of the most advanced missile defence systems in the world, from Arrow to David’s Sling and the Iron Dome, along with early warning systems and civilian shelters. These significantly reduce the impact of incoming attacks.
But ultimately, the most effective defence is offensive, targeting and destroying missile launchers at their source. That is what Israel is doing.
There is, of course, a price in any war. Israeli civilians are under threat, and casualties are real. But the public understands that the long-term risk posed by Iran, both directly and through its proxies, is far greater.
And that belief is shaped by past attacks, including October 7, when around 1,200 Israelis were killed. For many, this reinforced the need to confront what Israel sees as the root of the threat, what I would call the “head of the octopus”, Iran.
From this perspective, Iran is not just a threat to Israel. What it has done to the region is, frankly, unbelievable. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all tried to maintain stability and workable relations.
Yet Iran continues to escalate, targeting energy infrastructure and civilian centres across the region. So yes, Israeli society is resilient, and there is a willingness to endure hardship in order to confront what is seen as the root of the threat, Iran, and the network of groups it supports across the region.
There is a broader view, not just in Israel but among some Arab states as well, that enduring short-term pain may be necessary to deal with a larger, long-term threat and to ensure that this regime does not continue on its current path.
Q. You argue that Israeli society is willing to pay the price for this war. But the impact is not limited to Israel. This conflict has rattled oil markets and global trade, especially with tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. Does Israel accept that this war is imposing economic costs on ordinary people worldwide who have no direct stake in the conflict?
Amos Yadlin: Why blame Israel? The closure of, and threat to, the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s doing; it is Iran’s.
From Israel’s perspective, this only reinforces the argument that Iran is acting as a destabilising force in the region, effectively holding Gulf states hostage by targeting countries like the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, while threatening global energy routes.
This is what I described as the third chessboard, where Iran’s actions are impacting not just the region, but the global economy.
Israel, for its part, would prefer the Strait to remain open and stable. Its operations, as it sees them, are focused on Iranian military capabilities, ballistic missiles, nuclear infrastructure, and drone facilities.
The argument from Israel’s side is that these strikes are aimed at preventing Iran from projecting further instability across the region. Ultimately, Israel’s position is that the broader trajectory of the conflict, including any move towards ending it, will depend largely on decisions taken by the United States.
Q. There are reports that Iran may have dispersed or hidden enriched uranium stockpiles before key facilities were hit. Does Israel know where that material is, and can it guarantee that it has not survived the strikes?
Amos Yadlin: Highly enriched uranium, particularly at around 60 per cent, is well protected and can survive airstrikes. So, the challenge is not just hitting facilities, but dealing with the material itself.
There are essentially three ways to address this.
First, through an agreement, where the enriched uranium is either removed from Iran or diluted. There have been indications that Russia could take custody of this material as part of a broader deal.
Second, through a special operation to physically secure or remove it. This would be highly complex, but not impossible.
And third, by containing it where it is, while making it clear that any attempt to move or weaponise it would trigger a severe response.
From a strategic standpoint, the preferred option would be a diplomatic agreement that ensures this material is no longer available for weaponisation.
Q. You’ve said the objective was to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Based on Israeli intelligence today, has that goal been achieved, delayed, or made more difficult? And given that enriched uranium stockpiles may not have been fully hit, is there a risk that these strikes have backfired, pushing Iran to move faster and more covertly towards a nuclear weapon?
Amos Yadlin: No, enriched uranium by itself is not a bomb. There are several additional steps required to turn it into a weapon. From our assessment, this war has pushed Iran back from being just weeks away from a nuclear breakout to potentially one to two years away.
To get there, Iran would need to enrich uranium from around 60 per cent to weapons-grade levels. If key centrifuge facilities are destroyed, that process becomes extremely difficult.
Beyond enrichment, there are further stages, including converting the material into metal and integrating it into a deliverable warhead, each of which requires specialised infrastructure, some of which has already been targeted.
So the overall assessment is that Iran’s programme has been significantly set back. If Iran still chooses to pursue a weapon, it would likely trigger another war or confrontation, something neither side wants.
Q. Going back to the events of February 28, including the assassination of Ali Khamenei, which may have involved long-term surveillance and compromised systems, what does this indicate about the depth and sophistication of Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran?
Amos Yadlin: Intelligence is the art of fusing multiple sources. If you rely on just one stream, you will fail.
You need to integrate signals intelligence, human intelligence, and visual intelligence, from satellites, UAVs, and other surveillance platforms, along with cyber capabilities that allow penetration of networks and systems.
Israel has developed strong capabilities across all these domains, particularly in accessing and exploiting systems that generate continuous streams of data, whether through communications, sensors, or other digital infrastructure.
But the key is not just collection; it is what we call actionable intelligence. That means taking highly precise, real-time information and connecting it directly to operational platforms.
In practice, that involves the ability to identify targets, track them continuously, and then link that intelligence to strike capabilities, whether missiles, drones, or other assets, with very high accuracy.
This fusion, combining SIGINT, HUMINT, VISINT, and cyber, and turning it into real-time operational output, is where Israel has developed significant expertise.
And we have seen this model applied repeatedly, in the Gaza Strip, against Hezbollah, and now in the Iranian theatre.
Q. Speaking of India’s mediation efforts, PM Modi has spoken to both Benjamin Netanyahu and Masoud Pezeshkian, urging de-escalation and dialogue. How do you assess India’s attempt to balance both sides in this conflict, and can New Delhi realistically play a meaningful mediating role?
Amos Yadlin: I think Prime Minister Modi is respected in both countries, and that gives him a unique ability to try and play a constructive role in ending the war. The fact that he can speak directly to Prime Minister Netanyahu on one side and the Iranian president on the other is, in itself, significant.
However, we also have to be realistic about where power lies in Iran. The president is not the one ultimately running the show. In fact, just about two weeks ago, the Iranian president publicly suggested that Iran should avoid attacking its Arab neighbours. Within an hour, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched missiles and drones across the Gulf.
So while diplomatic outreach is important, the real decision-making authority in Iran sits elsewhere.
That said, I would very much welcome and encourage Prime Minister Modi’s efforts. A leader with his stature and credibility stepping in to try and de-escalate tensions is important.
At the same time, we are seeing indications that any potential negotiations may not even involve Israel directly. Unfortunately, there is talk of channels opening via Pakistan, possibly in Karachi. Pakistan, of course, has no diplomatic relations with Israel, which underlines that this is shaping up more as a US–Iran track than a direct Israel–Iran negotiation.
And that reinforces a broader point: this war was not initiated by Israel alone, and it is unlikely to be concluded by Israel alone. The United States is a central actor in how this conflict evolves and eventually ends.
If Prime Minister Modi is able to secure even a basic commitment from Iran, that it will stop calling for Israel’s destruction, refrain from actions aimed at harming Israel, and move towards recognising Israel as a legitimate state, that could be a significant step.
If that happens, then a more stable and peaceful West Asia would not just benefit the region, but all of us.
Q. So, what does victory look like for Israel at this point? Is there a clear endgame, or are we entering a prolonged cycle of escalation with no defined off-ramp?
Amos Yadlin: For Israel, victory is defined by the two objectives it set at the start of the war.
First, degrading Iran’s military capabilities that threaten Israel’s existence, especially its ballistic missile arsenal and nuclear programme. On that front, we are very close.
Second, creating conditions for regime change. That cannot be achieved from the air; it has to come from within. Ultimately, it is the Iranian people who will determine that outcome.
Israel’s war is not with Iran as a nation, but with the regime. There is respect for the Iranian people and a desire to return to peaceful relations, as existed before 1979.
The timing of regime change is impossible to predict. History has shown that such shifts, whether in the collapse of the Soviet Union or elsewhere, often come unexpectedly.
But there is a belief that the Iranian people deserve better, given the economic hardship, inequality, and lack of opportunity they face. And if change comes, it will come from them.
March 28, 2026, 18:43 IST
Read More
Source link
[ad_3]
