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George Yeo said some in India distrust closer China ties and some in Beijing underestimate India, but it is in New Delhi’s strategic interest to normalise relations
Former Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo at the Rising Bharat Summit. File image/News18
At a time when global fault lines are sharpening and Asia is recalibrating its balance of power, News18’s Rising Bharat Summit brought together leaders, policymakers, and strategic thinkers from across the world. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi adding political weight and visibility to the gathering, the conversations went well beyond symbolism. They cut to the heart of how India sees itself in a rapidly shifting world order.
Among the prominent international voices at the summit was George Yeo, Singapore’s former foreign minister, a longtime observer of Asia’s strategic evolution, and a recipient of the Padma Bhushan. A week after returning to Singapore, Yeo spoke exclusively with News18, offering a Southeast Asian perspective on India’s rise, its uneasy equation with China, and the wider strategic landscape stretching from ASEAN to Washington.
He reflected on why India and China still lack basic mutual understanding, whether New Delhi gives ASEAN the priority it deserves, and why Singapore remains cautious about joining BRICS. He also weighed in on India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, its decision to walk out of RCEP, and why, through Southeast Asia’s lens, stability between Asia’s two great civilisations is not a luxury but a necessity.
Edited excerpts below:
India and Singapore often call each other “natural partners”. Beyond symbolism, what is the one structural gap still holding this relationship back?
Singapore on its own is too small to be a natural partner of India. The real context is larger. Singapore matters most as a gateway for India into Southeast Asia and East Asia. If India sees Singapore as a portal to ASEAN and Greater China, the relationship takes on far greater economic and strategic weight.
It is not enough for India to be interested in Singapore in isolation. That interest must extend to the wider region. Likewise, Singapore can play a vital role in helping ASEAN and Greater China understand India better. When you frame the partnership within that broader geography, Singapore truly becomes a natural partner of India.
Trade is strong, defence ties are expanding, and fintech cooperation is growing. But is there enough strategic alignment on China?
There is still too little mutual understanding between India and China. In India, some view deeper engagement with China with suspicion. In China, there are quarters that underestimate India, although the antagonism towards India is far less intense than what China faces elsewhere. What troubles me most is the basic lack of knowledge each side has about the other, even at the level of geography and history.
From Singapore’s perspective, there is much to gain from a normalisation of ties between these two great civilisations. Separated by the high Himalayas, they do not share a long history of sustained conflict. The 1962 border war remains a lingering wound in India, but it had largely faded from Chinese memory until the recent clashes in Galwan. Given that there was no clearly delineated boundary between the British Raj and Qing China, it is only natural that the border remains a major agenda item. But it should not define the entire relationship, which ought to be primarily economic and political.
Singapore’s sincere hope is that India and China move towards better relations. That would not only benefit India, China, and Singapore but also help secure peace and development in Asia for decades to come.
Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath recently visited Singapore to attract investments. How do Singaporean investors view India’s largest state today: as an opportunity or regulatory risk?
Both. Uttar Pradesh has made significant progress under Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. It was important that he came personally to engage with the business community. Very few Singaporeans are familiar with UP or the changes taking place there in recent years.
More Singaporean companies should visit the state and see the reality on the ground rather than rely solely on news reports. Of course, there are risks. But those risks must be weighed against the opportunities created by policy reforms and the steady growth of UP’s economy.
India’s infrastructure is improving, and its middle class continues to expand. For investors willing to take a long-term view, the opportunity is substantial.
Singapore’s urban governance model is often cited globally. What lessons from Singapore can India adapt as it builds next-generation cities?
Singapore, as an experiment in urban planning and municipal management, can be of interest to Indian cities. Many Chinese cities study Singapore’s successes and failures carefully to draw lessons for their own development.
That said, Singapore is in no position to prescribe solutions to Indian cities. We are not intimately familiar with local ground conditions. But we can certainly share our experiences openly and help Indian policymakers and urban planners examine what worked for us, what did not, and why.
Beyond that, Singapore has long been India’s gateway to ASEAN. In your view, has India fully leveraged that, or is there still untapped potential in Southeast Asia?
I have long felt that India does not give sufficient priority to ASEAN. There remains considerable untapped potential. ASEAN is India’s immediate neighbourhood.
Historically, the relationship between India and Southeast Asia has not been shaped by conflict but by trade, culture, and cooperation. That foundation is a strength India can build upon. If India engages ASEAN more consistently and strategically, the gains could be significant for both sides.
ASEAN centrality is often spoken about, but is ASEAN still strategically relevant in an era of US–China rivalry?
ASEAN has always been a buffer between India and China. It is the space where the strategic mandalas of both civilisations overlap. Today, ASEAN is benefiting significantly from China’s rise, and it increasingly views India’s rise in a positive light. A stronger India adds balance to the region, and balance is something ASEAN values deeply.
In the context of US-China rivalry, ASEAN’s instinct is not to take sides but to preserve peace and cooperation. Its long-standing approach has been to remain friendly with all major powers. If any one power pushes too hard, ASEAN’s natural response is to lean in other directions to maintain equilibrium.
India walked out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In your view, did that decision weaken its credibility in ASEAN capitals?
Yes, especially because the decision was taken at the last minute. That said, we understand the compulsions of Indian domestic politics. My expectation is that India will eventually join RCEP, and hopefully sooner rather than later. I am sure the other members, including China, would be prepared to show flexibility on areas that are particularly sensitive for India.
Even outside RCEP, India should continue engaging the grouping at the political level. Over time, that can create the conditions for economic convergence. If India, in addition to a free trade agreement with the European Union, also has one with Southeast and East Asia, the boost to its long-term economic development would be significantly enhanced.
On the security front, as China continues to assert itself unilaterally in the South China Sea, how should India advance its Indo-Pacific strategy while preventing Beijing from further destabilising the region?
It is in the interest of both China and ASEAN to develop an effective Code of Conduct for managing disputes in the South China Sea. No claimant state will find it easy to relinquish historical claims. But there is still ample room for cooperation in areas such as fisheries management, joint development of resources, and environmental protection.
Freedom of navigation has not become a serious issue and should not be allowed to become one. For India, the wisest Indo-Pacific strategy is not to take sides but to position itself as a force for stability and a peacemaker in the wider region.
From Singapore’s perspective, is India’s approach to China too reactive and security-driven, or sufficiently strategic?
It is in India’s strategic interest to normalise relations with China, just as it is in China’s interest to do the same. From Southeast Asia, tensions between India and China feel like parents quarrelling. No one is comfortable with it. We would much rather see a harmonious relationship between the two.
There may once have been a view that India could gain more by pivoting decisively towards the United States. But it is now clear that India’s relationship with the US is also complex. In the end, India will have to manage all its major relationships with care, including the one with China.
Beyond regional tensions, despite wealthy, globally integrated economies like the UAE joining BRICS, Singapore has stayed out. Even as India and Brazil stress the bloc is not anti-West or about replacing the dollar, what holds Singapore back? Is this reluctance really economic or political?
Singapore’s reluctance is political. We are not anti-Western, and we do not wish to be seen as anti-Western. Our position is shaped less by economics and more by the broader geopolitical signal that BRICS membership may send. Ideally, there should be a common ASEAN position on BRICS. That would ensure that engagement with the grouping does not become a divisive issue within ASEAN itself.
March 05, 2026, 08:00 IST
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